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THE "USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS"
EXCLUSION OF THE STANDARD FAMILY
AUTOMOBILE POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the painful results of the ownership of an automobile
is the recurring need to take it to a service station or garage for
repairs. After such repairs are completed, an employee of the
garage will often test drive the automobile to check the completed
repairs. While on such an errand, the serviceman may become in-
volved in an automobile accident in which he is at fault.
In such a situation, it is possible for the serviceman to be cov-
ered under three insurance policies.' If the serviceman is himself
the owner of an automobile and is insured by a Standard Family
Automobile Policy, then he would receive protection under the use
of a non-owned automobile provision.2 At the same time, the serv-
iceman can claim coverage under the standard omnibus clause of
the owner's insurance policy,3 as it is almost universally agreed that
he is driving with the permission of the named insured.4 Third,
if the garage or service station is insured under a garage liability
policy, as most large automobile establishments are, then the driver
would also have coverage under its provisions.5
I See Capece v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 N.J. Super. 462, 207 A.2d 207 (1965).
2 The Standard Family Automobile Policy includes the following per-
sons as insureds under the liability coverage:
"(b) With respect to a non-owned automobile,(1) the named insured,(2) any relative, but only with respect to a private passenger
automobile or trailer, provided the actual use thereof is with
the permission of the owner;"
LeFelt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J. Super. 538, 545, 177 A.2d 315, 319, al'd, 76
N.J. Super. 576, 185 A.2d 217 (1962).
3 The garage employee can claim to be an insured under the owner's
family automobile policy provisions which define insureds driving the
owned automobile as "(2) any other person using such automobile,
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of the named
insured... ." Ibid.
4 In most instances the garageman is assumed to be driving with the
implied permission of the named insured. See Hammer v. Malkerson
Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 132 N.W.2d 174 (1964); Capece v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 86 N.J. Super. 462, 207 A.2d 207 (1965). See generally Austin,
Permissive Use Under the Omnibus Clause of the Automobile Lia-
bility Policy, 29 INs. Coumcr. J. 49 (1962); Comment, The Omnibus
Clause: Its Application in Nebraska, 44 NEB. L. REV. 129 (1965). But
see Pollard v. Safeco Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. App. 583, 376 S.W.2d 730
(1963) which involved the issue of whether a garageman was a second
permittee of the named insured.
5 The Garage Liability Policy provides legal liability coverage for busi-
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While it is clear that a serviceman would be protected under
any available garage liability policy, when he attempts to gain lia-
bility coverage or to require the insurance company to handle his
defense under either his policy or the owner's policy, he is often met
with the contention that he was using the automobile in the "auto-
mobile business" and that such use is excluded from coverage under
the provisions of both Standard Family Automobile Policies. The
owner's insurer may deny coverage under an exclusionary clause
applicable to the use of the owned automobile, which commonly
reads:
This policy does not apply . .. to an owned automobile while
used in the automobile business, but this exclusion does not apply
to the named insured, a resident of the same household as the
named insured, a partnership in which the named insured or such
resident is a partner, or any partner, agent or employee of the
named insured, such resident or partnership. 6
The serviceman may also be denied coverage under a similar pro-
vision in his family automobile policy relating to the use of a non-
owned automobile in the automobile business. 7 Currently, all
such policies define the term "automobile business" to mean "the
business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or
parking automobiles.""
The named insured and several other classes are not affected
by the owned automobile clause as they are excluded from its opera-
tion. These individuals are always provided with liability coverage
if they should be held legally responsible for the use of the car,
even though the driver may not be covered as an additional insured
nesses commonly known as garages, or engaged in some activity per-
taining to motor vehicles. Eligible for such insurance are automobile
sales agencies, including franchised and non-franchised dealers, repair
shops, service stations, storage garages, public parking places, and
equipment dealers. When driving a customer's automobile a service-
man is protected by a section which provides automobile liability
coverage for the use in connection with garage operations of any
automobile which is neither owned nor hired by the named insured,
a partner therein, or a member of the same household as any such
person. See generally 12 COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 45:108 (1964).
6 LeFelt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J. Super. 538, 546, 177 A.2d 315, 319, af'd, 76
N.J. Super. 576, 185 A.2d 217 (1962).
7 Such family automobile policies also contain a provision which ex-
cludes liability coverages to "a non-owned automobile while used in
the automobile business by the named insured."
s As the Standard Family Automobile Policy was originally drafted by
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, it defined "automobile
business" merely in terms of "business," but it was subsequently
amended to include "or occupation" in an attempt to include activity
conducted on a regular basis but not necessarily for profit.
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because the vehicle was being used in the automobile business.9
Both the owned and non-owned automobile exclusions are only
applicable to the liability section of the Standard Family Automo-
bile Policy, and as such relieve the insurer from the obligation to
pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which the
insured or additional insureds may become legally responsible.
However, an analogous provision occurs in the medical payments
section,'0 which serves a similar purpose although usually inter-
preted as a broader exclusion."
There are many other factual situations besides the one men-
tioned in which the use of the vehicle could be a "use in the auto-
mobile business" so as to exclude the driver from liability coverage
under either his own policy or the car owner's insurance. In addi-
tion, where the garage employee is also covered under the busi-
ness's garage liability plan, another question arises as to the correct
apportionment of the insurance between the parties. The purpose
of this article will thus be two-fold: (1) to analyze the various fac-
tual situations which have occurred under the "automobile busi-
ness" exclusion and the rationales used to interpret it, and (2) to
examine the effect of a garage liability plan on coverage under the
exclusion.
II. HISTORY
Before the Standard Family Automobile Policy was written,
most standard automobile policies had a provision added to the
omnibus clause excluding from those entitled to be additional in-
sureds any person or organization, other than the named insured,
operating an automobile repair shop, public garage, sales' agency,
service station or public garage, with respect to any accident aris-
9 As a result these classes are always protected if liability should be
imposed upon them, but the clause does prevent the insurer from
becoming liable for judgments recovered against other additional in-
sureds under the omnibus clause who are using the automobile in the
automobile business. Cf. 7 APPmMma, IwsuRANC. LAw m PN CTICR .
§ 4372 (1962).
10 As currently written, the policy does not provide expenses for bodily
injury sustained by any person other than the named insured or a
relative "resulting from the maintenance or use of a non-owned auto-
mobile by such person while employed or otherwise engaged in the
automobile business."
11 The Medical Services part of the policy also contains a very broad
exclusion avoiding medical payments to any person who is employed
in the automobile business if compensated in whole or in part under
any workmen's compensation law.
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ing out of the operation thereof.12 The primary purpose of such a
restriction, commonly referred to as the "arising out of the opera-
tion of a repair shop" exclusion, was to prevent problems of over-
lapping or concurrent coverage with the special garage liability
policy which was specifically designed to cover the risks attendant
to the operation of such enterprises.13  The courts have also com-
mented that another reason for the restriction is the increased pos-
sibility that the automobile will be driven by irresponsible per-
sons, 1 4 noting that there is a great difference between the insured
granting permission to drive to a person known by him to be trust-
worthy and in delivering the automobile to a garage where any
employee might be required to drive or operate the car in the
course of his employment, regardless of his personal safety rec-
ord.15
Such provisions have been upheld, with one notable excep-
tion,16 as not against public policy or statutory "financial respon-
sibility" plans on the assumption that an insurance company may
insert in its automobile liability policies a provision excluding lia-
bility where at the time of the accident the automobile is being
12 Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 566, 132 N.W.2d 174,
176 (1964). See generally 7 Am. JuR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 125
(1963); 7 APPLEMAN, op. cit.osupra note 9, § 4372.
13 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 326 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959). See also Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn.
563, 132 N.W.2d 174 (1964).
14 Buxton v. Randel, 159 Kan. 245, 249, 154 P.2d 129, 131 (1964).
15 Paine v. Finkler Motor Car Co., 220 Wis. 9, 16, 264 N.W. 477, 480 (1936).
16 An exception to the policy's omnibus clause for garages, service sta-
tions, or repair shops is usually held valid even where a statute re-
quires the inclusion of an omnibus clause in automobile liability poli-
cies. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 186 Va. 204,
42 S.E.2d 298 (1947); Trollo v. McLendon, 4 Ohio App. 2d 30, 211
N.E.2d 65 (1965); see 13 CoucH, INsURANcE 2d § 45:982 (1965). But
see Exchange Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613, 15 Cal. Rptr. 897,
364 P.2d 833 (1961) which held that the application of such an exclu-
sion when the car was being driven with the permission of the named
insured would be contrary to the state's public policy as expressed by
a statute providing that a liability insurance policy shall insure the
person named therein and any other person using the described vehicle
with the express or implied permission of the insured against loss from
liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle. While many other states
have nearly identical "omnibus" statutes, including NEB. REV. STAT. §
60-534 (Reissue 1960), it is unlikely that they will follow the California
example of denying applicability to such exclusions. For an examina-
tion of the California piolicy, see Comment, 34 So. CAL. L. REv. 209
(1961).
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put to a particular use.17 The test under such provisions of the old
Standard Automobile Liability Policy was the occupation or iden-
tity of the person driving the automobile, and thus if the driver was
employed in one of the mentioned vocations and if the accident oc-
curred while he was driving within the scope of his employment the
insurance company was relieved from any coverage of the garage
employee as an additional insured. 8
However, where the person driving the car was not engaged in
the operation of a repair shop, garage, parking lot, or the like, the
exclusion did not apply.19 Thus, where the operator engaged in the
activity only as a hobby,20 where the operator was not acting
within the scope of his employment,21 or where the business in
which the operator was engaged could not be considered the type
of business listed in the exclusionary clause, 22 the exclusion was
not applicable and coverage existed under the omnibus clause.
When the Standard Family Automobile Policy became effec-
tive in 1956,23 it contained a new exclusionary clause applicable to
17 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 834 (1946). The Nebraska Supreme Court has
stated with respect to exclusionary clauses that: "The parties to an
insurance contract may make the contract in any legal form they de-
sire, and, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, insur-
ance companies have the same right as individuals to limit their
liability and to impose whatever conditions they please upon their
obligations, not inconsistent with public-policy. If plainly expressed,
insurance insurers are entitled to have such exceptions and limitations
construed and enforced as expressed." Garrelts v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 176 Neb. 220, 125 N.W.2d 678 (1964). But cf. Protective
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963) as
to the controlling effect of Nebraska's "omnibus statute" over incon-
sistent provisions of the insurance policy.
1s 13 COUCH, INSURANCE 2d §§ 45:980-90 (1965); Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 556
(1956); see, e.g., Nyman v. Monteleone-Iberville Garage, Inc., 211 La.
375, 30 So.2d 123 (1947); Kenner v. Century Indem. Co., 320 Mass. 6,
67 N.E.2d 769 (1946).
19 7 APPLEmAN, op. cit. supra note 9, § 4372.
20 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Mut. Ins. Co., 33 IM. App. 2d 172, 178
N.E.2d 675 (1962) (a truck driver repairing cars in his spare time in
an alley garage was not operating an automobile repair shop.)
21 Libero v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 141 Conn. 574, 108 A.2d 533
(1954).
22 Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 26,
159 N.E.2d 7 (1959) (a machine shop operated by a mining company
where its vehicles, most of which could not be driven on state roads,
was not an automobile repair shop); Arditi v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co., 315 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. App. 1958) (a firm engaged in welding
tanks to tank trucks was not an organization operating an automobile
repair shop within the exclusion clause.)
23 The Standard Family Automobile Policy was drafted by the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 60 John St., New York 38, New York.
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the use of owned and non-owned automobiles in the automobile
business, which was substituted for the previous exception to the
omnibus clause covering accidents arising out of the operation of
repair shops or sales agencies. It has been stated that the new ex-
clusion relating to the automobile business was not intended to ac-
complish any substantial change in the coverage from the previ-
ous exclusionary clauses.24 However, most courts which have had
an opportunity to construe the new exclusion have felt that the
change in language was intended to broaden coverage by restricting
the scope of the previous exclusion clause. 25 Rather than a con-
sideration of the business or occupation of the person driving the
car at the time of the accident, the new automobile business ex-
clusion clause provides a test of the business the car is being used
in.26 As a driver may be employed in an automotive business and
yet not be using the automobile in that business, the net result
has been an extension of insurance coverage under the new clauses.
Therefore, situations arising under the older exclusionary clauses
are not controlling precedents, and such cases must be distinguished
from situations involving the "used in the automobile business" ex-
clusions.27
The new requirement imposes two requisites before coverage is
excluded. First, it is necessary to establish that the type of busi-
ness enterprise or organization involved comes within the term
"automobile business" as defined in the Standard Family Automo-
bile Policy. Second, the automobile must be used within the
"automobile business" in the context which the courts have inter-
preted the term "used."
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS
The policy defines the term "automobile business" to include
the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or
24 Risjord & Austin, Standard Family Automobile Policy, 411 INS. L.J. 199
(1957).
25 Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 571, 132 N.W.2d
174, 179 (1964); see also Goforth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 616,
619 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 327 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1964).
26 LeFelt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J.- Super. 538, 549, 177 A.2d 315, 322, affd, 76
N.J. Super. 576, 185 A.2d 217 (1962).
27 Chavers v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 188 F. Supp. 39, 43 n.5
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 295 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1961). See 7 APPLEDIAN,
INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 4372 (Supp. 1965). For a collection
of cases arising under the "used in the automobile business" exclusion,
see 13 CoucH, INSURANCE 2d §§ 45:971-79 (1965); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 2d
964 -(1960).
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parking automobiles. 28 These categories are exclusive and if not
applicable the driver would be insured as an additional insured.
To constitute a "business", the courts have required that the
occupation or undertaking be engaged in with some regularity and
for profit. In one of the first cases decided under the Standard
Family Automobile Policy provisions, Cherot v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co.,29 it was held that a part-time repairman who repaired
automobiles as a hobby for the actual cost of the parts was not en-
gaged in the "automobile business." The court placed heavy em-
phasis upon the permanency of the use involved, and whether the
additional insured was engaged only in a hobby or whether he
charged for his labors. Since the repairman derived no pecuni-
ary benefit or gain from his work, the court concluded that as a
matter of law he could not be engaged in the "automobile business."
Thus, as was true under the old exclusion clause, 0 where the opera-
tor repairs automobiles only occasionally or in his spare time as a
non-remunerative hobby31 he does not come within the exclusion
and is covered under the policy.
Another approach to the question of what constitutes a "busi-
ness or occupation" is to determine whether the use falls within
the policy's definition of these terms. In conformity with the axiom
that where an ambiguity exists an insurance contract must be
construed in favor of the insured,32 the term "automobile business"
has been strictly limited to the policy's definition. For instance
where an accident occurred during the transportation of a cus-
tomer's automobile to the service garage -by a garage employee, it
was held that the accident did not involve the automobile business
because "transporting" was not within the policy's definition of "au-
28 LeFelt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J. Super. 538, 546, 177 A.2d 315, 322, affd, 76
N.J. Super. 576, 185 A.2d 217 (1962).
29 264 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1959).
30 See note 20 supra.
31 The policy in Cherot was before the Family Automobile Policy's defi-
nition of "automobile business" was amended to include "or occupa-
tion" so that the court was only concerned with what constituted a
business. The addition of "or occupation" was probably added to cover
the situation where the activity was conducted regularly but not neces-
sarily for profit. For an indication that the amendment has affected
subsequent cases, compare LeFelt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J. Super. 538, 177
A.2d 315 affd, 76 N.J. Super. 576, 185 A.2d 217 (1962) in which it was
held that a part-time repairman was engaged in the "automobile busi-
ness." However, the repairman in LeFelt admitted that he often ac-
cepted pay for the repair work which he did on friends' cars.
32 12 CoucH, INsURANcE 2d § 45.9 (1964). See Lonsdale v. Union Ins. Co.,
167 Neb. 56, 91 N.W.2d 245 (1958).
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tomobile business."3 3 Since the burden is upon the insurance com-
pany to establish the exclusion, 34 it is incumbent upon them to
prove that the terms used in the policy encompass the activity
which is argued to be within the exclusion.
Goforth v. Allstate Ins. Co.35 implied that the automotive es-
tablishment's business would not begin until the customer's vehicle
reached the repair shop and that thereafter any movement would
be a component of the "automobile business. '36 However, such a
distinction has been noted and rejected in a case 37 which raised
such a factual issue.
If the status of the business enterprise or organization cannot
be considered to be one of the types listed in the definition, then the
courts will hold, as under the old exclusions,38 that the clause does
not apply. Even where the activity in which the automobile is
employed would appear to be within the terms of the definition,
where it is conducted only as an incident to the employer's non-
automotive business, such activity does not constitute a phase of the
"automobile business." For example, a restaurant that provides
parking service to its customers is not engaged in the automobile
business.39 This is in conformity with the principles behind the
exclusion, as the clause is meant only to exclude coverage where
the business establishment employing the automobile is one which
would ordinarily be insured by a garage liability policy.
Although there was originally some confusion concerning
whether the concept of business should be tested by the occupation
of the driver, the business of his employer, or the business of the
33 Goforth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 616 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 327
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1964). As no evidence was introduced at the trial
of any special meaning in the automotive trade attached to the words
"servicing" or "repairing," they would not be extended beyond their
common meaning to include the activity of "transporting." This is
not to say that the transportation of motor vehicles to and from a
garage could not be included within the term "automobile business,"
but only that some other term must be shown by trade usage to en-
compass the activity or else that the term "transportation" must be
included within the definition.
34 Caster v. Motors Ins. Corp., 28 Ill. App. 2d 363, 366, 171 N.E.2d 425,
426-27 (1961).
35 220 F. Supp. 616 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 327 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1964).
36 Id. at 619.
37 Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 569, 132 N.W.2d 174,
178 (1964).
38 See note 22 supra.
39 Chavers v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 188 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ohio),
aff'd, 295 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1961).
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insured,40 this has been clarified by subsequent decisions41 and the
addition of the word "or occupation"' ' to the definition. It is now
clear that the concept of business is to be judged by the status of
the business enterprise responsible for the movement of the vehicle.
This interpretation is sounder as it reflects the policy underlying
the exclusion of precluding liability coverage only where the auto-
mobile would be insured under the garage liability policy of an
automotive establishment. However, if the establishment is held to
be an "automobile business," it is necessary to ask further whether
the vehicle is being "used" in connection with such business.
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES "USE" WITHIN .THE "AUTOMO-
BILE BUSINESS"
The concept most changed by the Standard Family Automobile
Policy is whether the automobile is being used within the auto-
mobile business. The Standard Automobile Insurance Policy's re-
quirement that the accident "arise out of the operation of a repair
shop," etc., indicated a scope of employment test, while the new pro-
visions exclude coverage only if the automobile is being "used" in
the business.
It is generally considered that the term "while used in" is at
least ambiguous.43 It could mean that (1) the automobile is ex-
cluded if it is simply in the possession of an employee of an automo-
bile business, (2) the automobile is excluded only if it is used within
the scope of the business, or (3) the automobile is excluded only if
being driven in furtherance of the business or as an integral part of
the service thereof. Since any ambiguity is construed in favor of
the insured, most courts have rejected both the "custody" and the
40 See Insurance-What Constitutes "Use" Under Automobile Liability
Policy Excluding "Use" In The "Automobile Business?", 16 ALA. L.
REV. 184 (1963).
41 "To us, these examples make it fairly obvious that it is the type of
business enterprise or organization in which the automobile is used
that is envisioned by the automobile business exclusion clause in the
policy, and that the occupation of the person actually driving the car
is of no moment in the construction of the policy in this respect."
Chavers v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 188 F. Supp. 39, 42 (N.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 295 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1961).
42 Although the Chavers case involved a policy written before the addi-
tion of "or occupation" to the definition, the court noted the subsequent
amendment and used it as support for their conclusion that the busi-
ness must be analyzed in relation to the status of the business actually
employing the person parking the car. Id. at 42 n.5.
43 E.g., Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 790 (La. Ct. App. 1965). But
see, Kipper Chevrolet, Inc. v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 193 Kan. 637,
639, 396 P.2d 348, 350 (1964).
594 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 3 (1966)
"scope of business" tests and required that the use of the car be in
furtherance of the automobile business. As a result it is possible
for the driver to be employed in one of the defined types of enter-
prises and yet not fall within the exclusion if the automobile is not
being used in furtherance of the "automobile business." There are
now a sufficient number of cases to divide the use into certain
types of activity, and it is the purpose of this section to demonstrate
when these activities are considered to be in furtherance of the
"automobile business."
A. TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM THE GARAGE
There have been a large number of cases in which an accident
occurred while a garage employee was either transporting a cus-
tomer's automobile to or from the service garage. The leading case
in this area is McCree v. Jenning,44 where a friend of a repairman
was involved in an accident while he was returning a customer's
car to the point where it was to be picked up as an accommodation
to the repairman. The driver's insurer disclaimed liability on the
grounds that the vehicle was a non-owned automobile used in the
automobile business as it was being returned from being repaired.
The court rejected the contention that the relevant test was who
had possession or control, and ruled that the automobile must ac-
tually be employed for some purpose in connection with the auto-
mobile business. The return of a customer's car was not suffi-
ciently connected with the repair business to come within the ex-
clusion.45
Where the garage employee himself is returning a customer's
vehicle, it has been argued that such use must be a use in the auto-
mobile business as an employee of an automobile business is using
the car. However, Goforth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 46 a case involving
an accident which occurred while a garage repairman was driving a
customer's car back to the garage for further repairs, rejected such
a contention noting that it is the business the car is being used in
that is the determining factor, and not the business of the person
using the car.47
The majority of courts have accepted the McCree48 holding
44 55 Wash. 2d 725, 349 P.2d 1071 (1960).
45 Id. at 727, 349 P.2d at 1072.
46 220 F. Supp. 616 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 327 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1964).
47 Id. at 619.
48 Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 404 P.2d 995 (Wash.
1965). While the McCree case did not involve any coverage under a
garage liability plan since the driver was a friend of the amateur
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that the activity of transporting a customer's car is not a use in the
automobile business.49 This is true even when the transportation
is more closely related to the actual servicing, as when an accident
occurs while a garage employee is moving a customer's car from the
garage's parking lot into the garage for immediate servicing and re-
pair."0 While such a result may be acceptable in McCree where the
driver was not an employee of a service garage, to so hold where the
driver is a garage employee and actively engaged in the service of
the business is directly contra to the policy underlying the exclu-
sion, as it was under such business-related activity that the em-
ployee was intended to be insured only by a garage liability plan.'
A few courts have noticed this policy in holding that the trans-
poration of customer's automobiles is an integral part of the repair
shop's business. Thus, in Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Strohkorb,
52
where a garage employee was transporting a customer's car from
the service garage to the company's sales lot the court held that
the employee was engaged in a direct and ordinary course of his
employer's business and therefore the vehicle was being used in the
automobile business. In other cases, 53 the same underlying reason-
ing has been applied but verbalized in terms of whether the use
was incidental to the business involved. In others, from the factual
situation it would appear that the court was reasoning on the same
basis,54 although not generalizing what test was to be used.
repairman, in the present case the garage employee was also insured
under a garage liability policy. Therefore, the holding resulted in
just the problem of concurrent coverage between a family insurer and
a garage insurer which the exclusion was meant to prevent.
49 E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Surety Indem. Co., 246 S.C. 220, 143
S.E.2d 371 (1965); Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 790 (La. Ct.
App. 1965). Contra, Sanders v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 F.2d 777
(5th Cir. 1965) holding that the garage employee would be regarded
as the agent of the garage operator rather than of the car owner and
therefore he was using the automobile in the automobile business.
G0 Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 132 N.W.2d 174
(1964).
5' It would seem that the activity of moving the customer's car into the
garage could just as easily have been held to be an integral part of
"servicing" or "repairing," as the movement of cars within the service
establishment is an integral part of its business. Also, the added risk
of numerous different repairmen driving a customer's car was one of
the reasons underlying the exclusion.
52 205 Va. 472, 137 S.E.2d 913 (1964).
53 See Pollard v. Safeco Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. App. 583, 376 S.W.2d 730 (1963).
5 4 See Kipper Chevrolet, Inc. v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 193 Kan. 637, 396
P.2d 348 (1964).
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B. REPAIRING OF AN AUTOMOBILE
All the cases which have involved accidents occurring during
the actual performance of repair work have held that the customer's
car was not being used in the automobile business. A prime exam-
ple is Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skawinski, 5 in which the named insured
under a family automobile policy ran an automobile repair and
maintenance business. While servicing a customer's vehicle, he in-
advertently raced the engine crushing the customer against a wall.
The insurer argued that the repairman was excluded from coverage
under his family policy because he was using a non-owned automo-
bile in the automobile business. In rejecting the contention, the
court adopted a test of whether the vehicle was being employed as a
part of or as a tool of the automobile business, or whether it was
merely the object of the defendant's business. In finding that the
customer's car was not being used as an integral part of the defend-
ant's business, the court frustrated the intent of the exclusion
clause. The opinion allows and encourages service station operators
to purchase family policies with their comparatively reduced rates
and at the same time become insured against the greater risks at-
tendant to the operation of an automobile business which were in-
tended to be covered by the higher rates of the garage liability
policy.50
The same reasoning has been applied where the garage employ-
ee was also insured under his employer's garage liability policy on
the basis that a reasonable man would understand that to be used
in the automobile business a vehicle must be employed for some
purpose in connection with the business and not merely at the es-
tablishment to be served or repaired. 57 Other courts have also held
that an automobile left in the custody of a service man for servic-
ing or repairs is not being used in the automobile business, although
more on the basis of controlling state precedents than any detailed
legal rationale. 58
C. TEST DRIviNG
The "used in the automobile business" exclusion has also been
applied to situations where automobiles were being test driven,
either to check on completed repairs or pursuant to a purchasing
arrangement. The results have not been the same, varying both in
55 40 Ill. App. 2d 136, 189 N.E.2d 365 (1963).
56 See the dissenting opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skawinski, 40 Iln.
App. 2d 136, 141, 189 N.E.2d 365, 368 (1965).
57 Case v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 105 N.H. 422, 201 A.2d 897 (1964).
58 Capece v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 N.J. Super. 462, 207 A.2d 207 (1965).
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the rationale and the underlying policy.
The leading case of LeFelt v. Nasarow5 9 held that the test
driving of a customer's automobile by a part time repairman was
not a use in the automobile business. Although the court consid-
ered the part time repairman to be engaged in the automobile
business,a0 the vehicle was not being used in the automobile busi-
ness as the word "used" refers to the use to which the car is being
put and not to the identity or occupation of the person driving it.
Because the driver was a part time repairman, the case involved a
contest between two family automobile insurers and the court
was influenced by the lack of liability insurance which would have
resulted if the use was held to be within the automobile business.6 1
That the courts may be influenced by the availability of ga-
rage liability insurance is shown by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 62 which held that the test driving by an
automobile salesman of the automobile of a prospective customer
was a use in the automobile business.6 3 The fact that the court
relied upon the provisions of the garage liability policy is shown
by its conclusion that as the use was clearly within the coverage of
that policy, it must also be a use in the sales agency within the
59 71 N.J. Super. 538, 177 A.2d 315, affd, 76 N.J. Super. 576, 185 A.2d 217
(1962). Contra, Trollo v. McLendon, 4 Ohio App. 2d 30, 211 N.E.2d 65
(1965).
60 Although the status of the amateur repairman is much like that in
Cherot v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 F.2d 767, 768 (10th Cir.
1959), it can be distinguished for two reasons. First, in LeFelt the
repairman admitted that he often received pay for the repair work
he did on friends' cars, and second, the addition of "or occupation" to
the definition of "automobile business" in the policy would make it
harder to find that the repairman was not at least in the occupation
of repairing automobiles.
61 The car owner's insurer disclaimed liability under the owned automo-
bile exclusion, while the repairman's insurer invoked the non-owned
automobile clause of his policy. Therefore, if the court found that the
car was being used in the automobile business, both policies would
not have applied. But this is not true of the typical situation where
a professional automobile business is involved, as it would usually be
insured under a garage liability policy. Hence, it would seem more
logical to hold that the repairman was not engaged in repairing auto-
mobiles with such regularity and for sufficient profit to be conducting
the "business or occupation" of repairing. The court was not without
authority under the old exclusions that an itinerant mechanic is not
conducting a repair shop, Bosshardt v. Commercial Cas. Co., 124 N.J.L.
54, 11 A.2d 49 (1940).
62 204 Va. 879, 134 S.E.2d 253 (1964).
63 The trial court found as a fact that the salesman was using the vehicle
in his automobile business because the evidence established that the
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meaning of the exclusion of the family automobile poicy.6 4 The
same reasoning has resulted in the testing of a used car by a pro-
spective customer being held a use in the automobile business.0 5
D. GARAGE EMPLOYEE USING AN AUTOMOBILE TO OBTAIN PARTS
Only one case6 6 has been decided under the new exclusion
clause on the point of whether an automobile used to obtain parts
for a garage is being used in the automobile business. Relying
upon precedents involving an identical situation under the old
exclusion clause, it was held that the obtaining of parts is an ac-
tivity directly connected to the conduct of an automobile business
and therefore the insured is excluded from liability coverage. The
case has been criticized for failing to recognize any distinction be-
tween the older clauses and the present exclusionary clause,67 but
the result is nevertheless correct when judged by the standards
since used by courts in other factual situations.6 Had the driver
insured his service station under a garage liability policy, he would
have been covered thereunder. The result is that there has been no
change from the holdings under the old exclusion clause, and it is
clear that the use of a vehicle for securing or delivering equipment
or supplies is a use in the automobile business.
E. LOANING OF AN AUTOMOBILE
Where the employee of a repair business or sales agency loans
his personal automobile to a customer to use while the customer's
car is being serviced or repaired, it is universally held that such is
dealer's purpose in driving the car was to aid him in getting an esti-
mate of the car's worth; that he had formerly considered the car as a
trading prospect; and that the testing of customers' automobiles pur-
suant to a trade was an important element of the sales dealership.
But cf. Pirkle v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D.
Ga. 1965), holding that a salesman's use of a customer's automobile to
drive it to an appraiser for an evaluation to be used in trade negotia-
tions was not a use in the automobile business.
64 Id. at 886, 134 S.E.2d at 257.
65 Hodapp v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 772 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964).
Contra, Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 146 S.E.
2d 410 (N.C. 1966).
66 Walker v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 40 IMI. App. 2d 463, 190 N.E.2d
121 (1963).
67 See Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 132 N.W.2d 174,
178 (1964).
68 The activity of obtaining parts is often cited as an example of a use
that would clearly be in the automobile business. See e.g., Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Skawinski, 40 Ill. App. 2d 136, 189 N.E.2d 365 (1963); Wilks
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 790 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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not a use in the automobile business. To prevent the application
of the exclusion disclaiming liability courts usually hold that such
use is a personal one rather than one connected with the busi-
ness.6 9 Others have looked at the use from the standpoint of the
driver, and as the customer is not engaged in the automobile busi-
ness, neither is such use.70 Although such a use is undoubtedly in
furtherance of the company's business, it lacks the attendant added
risk of the vehicle being placed in the possession of unknown driv-
ers7 1 as the employee personally knows who he has lent his automo-
bile to. In this way it is much like the personal lending of any
automobile under the omnibus clause. It should be noted that this
situation involves the loaning of an employee's personal automo-
bile to a customer. It is hardly doubted that if a company car
was loaned to a customer as a "courtesy car," that this would be a
use in the automobile business.7 2
It has also been held that the lending of a company demon-
strator to a garage employee for his personal use is not a use in the
automobile business.7 3 The rationale that this is a purely personal
use seems to be an adoption of the "scope of business" test, but may
be accounted for by the slightly different wording of the clause.
V. REVISION OF THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE
When the Standard Family Automobile Policy was drafted, it
was decided that the added risk attendant to the operation of a
family automobile by employees of an automotive establishment
would be more appropriately insured under a garage liability policy
with its higher rates set to compensate for the increased risk. As
a result the "used in the automobile business" exclusion was in-
serted to perform that function, which was formerly achieved by
the "arising out of the operation of a sales agency, repair shop," etc.,
exclusion of the old Standard Automobile Liability Policy. While
some courts have noticed this underlying policy,7 4 sometimes with
69 Provident Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 33 Mlise. 2d 530, 227 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1962).
70 National Farm Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah
2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963).
71 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
72 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skawinski, 40 111. App. 2d 136, 189 N.E.2d 365 (1963).
73 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 326 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959). Such use was held not to be in the "automobile business"
because the return of the vehicle was merely a necessary consequence
of the initial permission and incidental to the employee's personal use
of the automobile.
74 E.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Strohkorb, 205 Va. 472, 137
S.E.2d 913 (1964); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 204
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anomalous results, 75 the prevailing construction ignored the rea-
sons underlying the inclusion of the clause. The rigorous require-
ment that the use be in furtherance of the automobile business,
even where coverage under a garage liability policy was available,
resulted in situations where a garage employee was driving a cus-
tomer's car on business related to the automobile establishment and
yet still not be excluded from coverage under the family policy.7 6
To rectify this defect, in the 1963 revision of the Standard Fam-
ily Automobile Policy the wording of the exclusion was changed,
apparently in an attempt to return to the holdings under the
Standard Automobile Liability Policy. The revised clause now ex-
cludes liability coverage to owned 71 or non-owned78 automobiles
when used by any person while employed or otherwise engaged in
the automobile business. While the concept of "automobile busi-
ness"7 9 should remain unchanged, the emphasis of the clause has
Va. 879, 134 S.E.2d 253 (1964); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skawinski, 40 Ill.
App. 2d 136, 141, 189 N.E.2d 365, 368 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
75 In Pollard v. Safeco Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. App. 583, 376 S.W.2d 730 (1963),
a parking lot operator was involved in an accident while he was
driving a customer's car to a tire repair shop. The court held that
the car was being used within the "automobile business" under the
parking lot operator's family policy, but not under the customer's
family policy. As its reason for denying coverage under the operator's
policy, the court stated on rehearing: "As we pointed out in our
original opinion such exclusionary clauses are sustained as reasonable
and binding on the insured 'because of the increased hazard growing
out of the use of the non-owned cars by such establishments while in
their legal custody.' It would be grossly unfair to the insurer to hold
that an insured engaged in the automobile business could take out a
policy on his privately owned and operated car and then on the basis
of the same small premium claim protection for any and all non-owned
automobiles used in such business. Policies of that nature providing
general coverage for such businesses carry a much higher premium
rate." Id. at 589, 376 S.W.2d at 734.
76 E.g., Capece v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 N.J. Super. 462, 207 A.2d 207 (1965);
Hammer v. Malkerson Motors, Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 132 N.W.2d 174
(1964).
77 The typical exclusion now reads: "to an owned automobile while used
by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in
the automobile business. . . ." Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
181 So. 2d 841, 842 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
78 The analogous provisions excluding non-owned automobiles reads:
"to a non-owned automobile while maintained or used by any person
while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in (1) the auto-
mobile business of the Insured or of any other person or organization.
." Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Sharrow, 249 F. Supp. 429, 430 (S.D.
Fla. 1965).
79 The policy still retains the definition of "automobile business" as the
business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or park-
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changed from the use being made of the automobile to the business
or occupation of the driver. Although the words "employed or
otherwise engaged in" still retain a degree of ambiguity,80 they will
probably have to be limited to mean that the driver must be using
the automobile within the scope of the establishment's business.81
Even so, it seems clear that such activity as repairing, transport-
ing, road testing, or obtaining parts would be excluded. However,
the loaning of an automobile to a customer, whether an employee's
personal vehicle or the garage's, would not be excluded as the
person driving would not be employed or engaged in the automo-
bile business.
The revision has mainly been adopted by insurers who belong to
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and is not yet in
universal usage.8 2 Few cases have yet appeared involving the re-
vised clause, but additional aid in construing it can be derived
from analogous provisions previously in use.83 The revised cladse
provides a clear insight into what was intended to be accomplished
by the original "use in the automobile business" exclusion. Wheth-
er it will be adopted by the unaffiliated, mainline insurers will in
part depend upon the subsequent construction given to it by the
courts.
ing automobiles. Therefore, the cases arising under the old clause
concerning what is an "automobile business" should be controlling
precedents under the revised clause. See Part InI supra.
80 Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 181 So. 2d 841, 843 (La. Ct. App.
1965). These words could be read to exclude coverage: (1) When-
ever the driver is employed or engaged in the "automobile business,"
(2) where the driver is using the automobile in the scope of employ-
ment of the "automobile business," or (3) only while the driver is
actually engaged in servicing, repairing, storing or parking automo-
biles.
81 Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Sharrow, 249 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
But see Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 181 So. 2d 841 (La. Ct.
App. 1965) which limited the clause to accidents occurring only while
servicing an automobile, so that the returning of a customer's car after
the repairs had been completed was not excluded.
82 The members of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters are
mostly small, independent insurers. The large nonaffiliated insurers
draft their own policies, although often closely following the provisions
of the standard policies. These nonaffiliated insurers have not yet re-
vised their policies to conform with the revision of the standard policy.
83 See Piliero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 130, 209 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1960)
where an exclusion as to any person "employed in or operating an
automobile business" was interpreted to require a definite employer-
employee relationship so that the policy did not exclude a person work-
ing at a restaurant parking lot as a voluntary, unofficial attendant re-
ceiving only tips from customers and not supervised or controlled by
the restaurant owners.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The litigious history of the exclusion clause was the result of
poor draftmanship and an undue adherence by the courts to the
principles of construction rather than an analysis of the policy
underlying the clause. The revised clause should go far to clear up
the uncertainties inherent in the original exclusion. However, to
insure its proper construction and legitimate effect, courts must rec-
ognize the policies which moved the insurers to insert the exclusion
in the family policy.
Robert S. Lingo '66
